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INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 had the noble goal of
eliminating discrimination. Specifically, the Act “addressed and
prohibited discrimination in public accommodations, public
school education, federally-funded programs, and private sector
employment” based on race, sex, religion, and other protected
classifications.1
Title VII of the Act was implemented to
eliminate discrimination in the workforce and “created an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to administer and
enforce the statute.”2 Congress, however, only gave the EEOC
“the authority to seek enforcement by ‘informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion’ but not the authority to
compel compliance.”3 As written, Title VII was broad and left
enforcement ambiguous and violations undefined.4
Thus,
Congress left the task of determining what constituted a
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1
Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories,
and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 379 (1995).
2
Id. at 379–80.
3
Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and
Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 431, 433 (2005) (footnote omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012)).
4
Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII:
Disparate Impact Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 305, 305–06 (1983).
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violation of the Act, the standards of pleading, and the proof
required for successful enforcement of Title VII to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Justice Thurgood Marshall sat on the Supreme Court during
the first twenty years of decisions rendered by the Court
interpreting Title VII. These seminal decisions transformed Title
VII from a “poor enfeebled thing”5 into a vehicle for social reform
that equalized access to the courts by allowing employees to take
action against private employers’ discriminatory practices. This
Article highlights Justice Marshall’s influence on the
development of Title VII jurisprudence. Part I presents a brief
overview of Justice Marshall’s personal and professional life
before becoming a Justice to show how his experience influenced
the development of his judicial philosophy. Part II summarizes
the Court’s approach to some of the issues left unresolved by
Congress in the initial passage of Title VII. Specifically, it
explores how the Court determined what would constitute a
violation of Title VII and standards of pleading and proof. Part
III examines the changes in the Court’s jurisprudence before
Justice Marshall retired from the bench. As the majority of
Justices became less sympathetic to the protection of African
Americans in the workplace, Justice Marshall’s voice of dissent
emerged. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, which vindicated Justice Marshall’s choice to dissent
by adopting many of the positions taken in his departure from
the majority view.
THE MAKING OF A “SOCIAL ENGINEER”

In a tribute to Justice Marshall, Justice William Brennan
addressed what he believed made Justice Marshall a unique
voice on the Court.6 He attributed the unique views of Justice
Marshall to “the special voice that he added to the Court’s
deliberations and decisions.”7 He described Justice Marshall’s
voice as a first person voice of authority and reason with the
“unwavering message” that “the Constitution’s protections must
not be denied to anyone and that the Court must give its
constitutional doctrine the scope and the sensitivity needed to
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Belton, supra note 3, at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted).
William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 23, 23 (1991).
7
Id.
6
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Id.
Id.
10
Lynn Adelman, The Glorious Jurisprudence of Thurgood Marshall, 7 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 113, 115 (2013).
11
U.W. Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Making Bricks Without Straw: The NAACP
Legal Defense Fund and the Development of Civil Rights Law in Alabama
1940–1980, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1121, 1130 & n.49 (2001).
12
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND
THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 6 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
RANDALL WALTON BLAND, JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL: CRUSADER FOR
LIBERALISM 31 (2001).
17
Clemon & Fair, supra note 11, at 1131.
9
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assure that result.”8 Justice Brennan believed that what shaped
Justice Marshall’s judicial voice were his personal experience of
racial segregation and the years he spent as an advocate “using
the tools of legal argument to close the gap between
constitutional ideal and reality.”9 Justice Marshall gained his
voice while attending college and law school. He attended
Lincoln University where faculty and fellow students nurtured
his belief in racial equality.10 Upon graduating from Lincoln, he
enrolled in Howard Law School after being refused admission to
his home state law school at the University of Maryland because
of his race.11 At Howard, Marshall came under the mentorship of
Charles Hamilton Houston and was exposed to the “social
engineering” theory.12
Houston taught that lawyers should regard themselves as
engineers of the social order and, as such, must decide how to use
the law to construct a fair and just society.13 Houston stressed
that lawyers should understand more than just the legal rules;
they should also appreciate “the social setting in which the law
operated.”14 An effective lawyer needs to explain to the courts
how their decisions impact the lives of everyday people and “how
rules actually operate[] in society.”15 Houston brought his social
engineering theory to life through his work with the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”)
along with his mentee, Marshall, who assisted in the execution of
this theory in the courts.16
Shortly after joining the cadre of lawyers assembled by
Houston, Marshall became the General Counsel of the NAACP in
1938.17 Marshall’s time working with the NAACP “solidified his

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 143 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

3/24/16 12:13 AM

FINAL_SCOTT.DOC

674

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:671

18

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

Adelman, supra note 10, at 117.
Clemon & Fair, supra note 11, at 1131.
20
Julius L. Chambers, Thurgood Marshall’s Legacy, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1250 (1992).
21
Taunya Lovell Banks, Thurgood Marshall, the Race Man, and Gender
Equality in the Courts, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 15, 16 (2010).
22
Chambers, supra note 20.
23
Adelman, supra note 10, at 121.
24
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1961–1991, at 5 (1997) (citing Sandra Day O’Connor,
Thurgood Marshall: The Influence of a Raconteur, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1217–18
(1992); Byron R. White, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 44 STAN. L. REV.
1215, 1216 (1992)).
25
Belton, supra note 3.
19
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conviction that a committed and skillful lawyer could accomplish
a considerable amount in the struggle to create a more just and
equal society.”18 Influenced by the NAACP’s belief that equality
was achieved through the courts, Marshall spearheaded a
campaign to bring cases “throughout the nation and challeng[e]
segregation by all means necessary.”19
Marshall used the litigation of these cases to achieve social
reform and, in doing so, “altered the nation’s legal system and
created public interest advocacy which in turn legitimized
American democracy by securing access to the promise of equal
justice under law for the disadvantaged and powerless in our
society.”20 As a social engineer, he knew that access to the courts,
especially the federal courts, was the “primary vehicle to pursue
equal rights” and the only way to change society.21
Thus, as Justice Brennan observed, Marshall’s experience as
an African-American lawyer laid the foundation for his
unwavering jurisprudential commitment, during his tenure on
the Court, to secure equality and fairness through the judicial
process.22 Marshall “was deeply sympathetic to the efforts of
subordinated groups,”23 and, through his judicial opinions, he
gave voice to those directly impacted by the Court’s decisions.24
The opinions he authored in Title VII cases exemplify his belief
in the social engineering theory and demonstrate his
endorsement of the idea that Title VII could be “a powerful
engine for social change by equalizing employment opportunities”
for all.25 In a nation struggling to move past Jim Crow Era
segregation, Marshall would interpret Title VII as another
means to hasten the eradication of discrimination in the
workplace and employment practices.
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II. JUSTICE MARSHALL AND THE EARLY YEARS OF TITLE VII
The Supreme Court first issued its Title VII opinions during
Justice Marshall’s tenure.
In those opinions, the Court
determined what constituted a violation of Title VII and how a
litigant could successfully meet the pleading and proof
requirements.
A.

Defining Violation

26
27
28
29
30

32
33
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31

400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam).
Id. at 543.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 544–47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 545.
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The Supreme Court issued its first opinion in a Title VII case
in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.26 Phillips raised the issue of
whether an employer’s practice of hiring men, but not women,
with school-aged children constituted a violation of Title VII.27
Phillips commenced an action under Title VII alleging that she
had been denied employment because of her sex since the
employer was not accepting job applications from women with
preschool-aged children.28 In a per curiam opinion, the Court
held “that persons of like qualifications [should] be given
employment opportunities irrespective of their sex.”29 However,
the Court held that “the existence of such conflicting family
obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for
a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for
distinction” in hiring practices.30 The Court reasoned that an
employer could demonstrate that the hiring condition “is a bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”31
Seeing the potential for the entrenchment of a gender-based
stereotype in Title VII case law, Justice Marshall wrote a special
concurring opinion.32 He cautioned the Court not to “[fall] into
the trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards about
the proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination.”33 He
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Id. at 547.
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Id. at 435
Id. at 430, 434.
Id. at 433–34.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 431.
Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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urged instead that employment opportunities should be limited
“only by employment criteria that are neutral as to the sex of the
applicant.”34
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,35 the Supreme Court broadened
the scope of what constitutes discriminatory conduct that violates
Title VII. Justice Marshall joined a unanimous Court, which
held that an employer violated Title VII when it utilized a
facially neutral practice or procedure that was not justified out of
business necessity and, in application, negatively impacted a
particular group.36 The Court went further, holding that, based
on the legislative history of the Act and guidelines issued by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
Congress did not require proof of discriminatory intent for a
violation to occur under Title VII.37 The EEOC guidelines were
an “administrative interpretation of the Act,” and “the enforcing
agency is entitled to great deference.”38 The Court reasoned that
the legislative history of the Act supported the guidelines issued
by the EEOC, and, therefore, the guidelines should be treated as
expressing the intent of Congress.39 Using the EEOC guidelines,
the Court held that Congress intended Title VII to allow for “the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.”40 Acknowledging the “built-in headwinds” facing
minorities entering the workforce, in broadening Title VII to
allow for facially neutral discrimination, the Court allowed for
greater access to the remedial measures available under Title
VII.41
The holding in Griggs aligned with Justice Marshall’s prior
work toward equalizing employment opportunities as a social
engineer. More importantly, Griggs allowed for an expansion of
access to the courts under Title VII. Justice Marshall joined in
laying a foundation to construct a more equal workplace with
“scores of cases involving many thousands of workers who ha[d]
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42
David J. Garrow, Toward a Definitive History of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 67
VAND. L. REV. 197, 229–31 (2014) (quoting Supreme Court Bars Employment Tests
That Result in Anti-Negro Discrimination, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1971, at 4) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
43
Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs: Rethinking the Title
VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1301, 1304–05 (1990).
44
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
45
Id. at 45.
46
Id. at 49.
47
Id. at 45.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 51.
50
427 U.S. 273 (1976).
51
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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been denied jobs or promotions because of non-job-related tests
which ha[d] come into widespread use since passage of Title VII
in 1964.”42
The Court continued to issue opinions that allowed for a
“broad construction of Title VII . . . consistent with the Act’s
remedial purposes.”43 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,44 the
Court demonstrated its commitment to expanding the right of
employees to bring private suits against employers for
discriminatory practices.45 Justice Marshall again joined a
unanimous Court to hold that Title VII allowed an aggrieved
party to seek redress through private action despite first
pursuing arbitration under a nondiscrimination clause of a
collective-bargaining agreement.46 The Court acknowledged that
Title VII gave private litigants the power to “not only redress[]
[their] own injur[ies] but also vindicate[] the important
congressional policy against discriminatory employment
practices.”47 The Court found that “the private right of action
remains an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of
Title VII” because an employee’s individual right to be free from
discriminatory practices cannot be waived.48 If the collectivebargaining process barred an employee’s right to bring a private
suit under Title VII, it “would defeat the paramount
congressional purpose behind Title VII.”49
In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.50 and
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,51 Justice Marshall authored
opinions advocating for the broad interpretation of Title VII to
achieve its remedial purpose. In McDonald, two white employees
were fired because of a theft for which they were held jointly and
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McDonald, 427 U.S. at 276.
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 279.
57
Id. at 284.
58
Michael J. Fellows, Note, Civil Rights—Shades of Race: An Historically
Informed Reading of Title VII, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 387, 415 (2004).
59
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986).
60
Id. at 67–68.
53
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severally liable with a black employee.52 Despite the shared
liability, the white employees were fired and the black employee
was not.53 The white employees brought an action for relief
under Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination in the
workplace.54 The Court was faced with the question of exactly
which races Title VII was meant to protect from discrimination.55
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall placed “racial
discrimination in private employment against whites on the
same terms as racial discrimination against nonwhites.”56 Even
when “theft of property . . . [is a] . . . compelling basis for
discharge[,] . . . this does not diminish the illogic in retaining
guilty employees of one color while discharging those of another
By opening Title VII to include claims of racial
color.”57
discrimination to a majority group, Justice Marshall broadened
the scope of Title VII to unprecedented breadth for individuals.
Nearly any person can allege racial discrimination without first
making a prima facie showing that he is a member of a racial
minority, even in the wake of committing fireable offenses.58
Consistent with Justice Marshall’s vision of equality, McDonald
expanded the meaning of racial discrimination past the point of
minority discrimination and allowed for completely equal access
to the courts and relief under the Act.
Meritor Savings Bank established that a claim of a hostile
work environment due to sexual harassment is considered sexual
discrimination and, thus, a violation of Title VII.59 The Court
expanded the relief available to victims of hostile environment
sexual harassment discrimination by holding that the
discrimination did not have to have an economic effect on an
employee to be actionable.60 The Court reinforced the power of
the EEOC in holding that the 1980 guidelines issued by the
agency “specifying that ‘sexual harassment,’ as there defined, is a
form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII,” and since its
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Id. at 65–66.
Id. at 72.
63
Id. at 67 (second alteration in original) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
64
Id. at 72.
65
Id. at 74.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 74–75.
62
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issuance, “courts have uniformly held . . . that a plaintiff may
establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work
environment.”61 The Court again refused to limit an employee’s
ability to bring private suit under Title VII by finding that the
“mere existence of a grievance procedure and a policy against
discrimination,” regardless of whether the employee invoked the
procedure, does not insulate an employer from liability.62
However, the Court set limitations on the ability of an employee
to initiate a sexual harassment claim. The Court held that “[f]or
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe
or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment
and create an abusive working environment.’ ”63 The Court
further held that it would not issue a definitive ruling as to when
an employer is liable for the actions of supervisors.64
Justice Marshall concurred with the Court’s holding that
hostile
environment
discrimination
constituted
sex
discrimination as defined by Title VII.65 He reiterated his
philosophy that every employee should have a workplace
environment that is free from discriminatory practices by
supporting the Court’s expansion of the definition of sex
discrimination. Justice Marshall, however, disagreed with the
Court’s refusal to rule on employer liability absent actual
knowledge of the harassment.66 Justice Marshall voiced his
belief that, in analyzing employer liability under Title VII for the
acts of employees, Title VII law clearly established that the act of
a supervisory employee or agent is imputed to the employer.67
His rejection of the Court’s agency theory in his concurrence
demonstrates his staunch stance on further broadening the scope
of Title VII and his ability to perceive the far-reaching
ramifications of such a decision.
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68
Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases:
Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1216 (1981)
[hereinafter Belton, Burdens of Pleading].
69
Id.
70
Id. at 1226.
71
Id. at 1207–09.
72
Banks, supra note 21.
73
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
74
Id. at 798.
75
Id. at 797–99.
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The Court also determined the pleading and proof
requirements under Title VII during Justice Marshall’s tenure.
The burden-of-pleading requirement functions to give parties to
an action notice of what must be alleged in a complaint or answer
to substantiate or rebuff the allegations.68
Burden-of-proof
standards allow courts to determine which party in an action
must present evidence and what evidence is necessary to support
or rebut a claim of discrimination.69 Because Title VII did not
address the requirements of proof and pleadings, the courts were
left to determine the procedural framework intended by the
statute.70 The constant battle to determine how one could
procedurally bring forth and prove a Title VII claim marked
Justice Marshall’s time on the Court.71
Justice Marshall
advocated for lower pleading and proof requirements in keeping
with his position that each citizen should have equal access to
the courts, especially the federal court system, based on his view
of the courts as the primary engine for social reform. 72
The most significant case to deal with pleading and proof
standards during the Marshall Era was McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.73 The Court granted certiorari “[i]n order to
clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action
challenging employment discrimination.”74 The Court reaffirmed
an employee’s right to bring private suit under Title VII, holding
that “a prior Commission determination of reasonable cause [is]
not a jurisdictional prerequisite to raising a claim” under Title
VII nor does the Act “restrict a complainant’s right to sue . . . and
we will not engraft on the statute a requirement which may
inhibit the review of claims of employment discrimination.”75

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 147 Side A

04/08/2016 13:04:55

3/24/16 12:13 AM

FINAL_SCOTT.DOC

2015]

INFLUENCE OF JUSTICE MARSHALL

681

76

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

Id. at 801–05.
Id. at 802 (“This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial
minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 802–03.
80
Id. at 804.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Recapturing Summary Adjudication Principles in
Disparate Treatment Cases, 58 SMU L. REV. 103, 122 (2005).
77
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The Court then established a three-prong proof and pleading test
to determine the sufficiency of employment discrimination
pleadings and the proof offered to substantiate claims and
defenses.76
First, the Court held that in a private Title VII suit, the
employee has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case
of discrimination against the employer.77 Under the second
prong of the test, “[t]he burden . . . shift[s] to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”78 to justify
its actions, effectively allowing the employer to rebut an
employee’s claim of discrimination.79 The Court was careful to
articulate that the inquiry did not end there.80 In other words,
Title VII did not permit an employer to disguise discrimination
by attempting to cover the discrimination with pretext.81
Therefore, the Court identified a third prong that allowed an
employee “a fair opportunity to show that [the employer’s] stated
reason for” its actions was, in fact, a pretext for discrimination
and that a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
employer’s action did not exist.82
Justice Marshall joined the unanimous opinion in McDonnell
Douglas that ultimately afforded plaintiff-employees both the
opportunity to offer the initial proof and the power to rebut an
employer’s pretextual justification. The decision also gave courts
the ultimate conclusive power to hear and determine the
employer’s reasoning and the validity of the employer’s decision
making.83 But while McDonnell Douglas set forth the general
pleading requirements for Title VII cases, the Court began to
carve out exceptions that did not garner Justice Marshall’s vote.
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432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977).
Id. at 79, 81.
86
Id. at 73–74.
87
Id. at 82.
88
Id. at 80–81.
89
Id. at 82.
90
Id. at 80–81.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 82 (quoting Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, 375 F. Supp. 887, 883
(W.D. Mo. 1947)).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 83.
85
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The Supreme Court decided its first religious discrimination
case under Title VII in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.84
Hardison defined religious discrimination under Title VII and set
the standard of proof for claims involving collective-bargaining
agreements.85
The Court held that “religion” encompasses
religious observance and practice and that an employer must
make reasonable accommodations for an employee, unless an
employer demonstrates that it could not reasonably accommodate
an employee without causing undue hardship on the employer’s
business.86 Despite the efforts of Trans World Airlines (“TWA”),
however, it could not reasonably accommodate Hardison’s
religious requirements without violating the collectivebargaining agreements between TWA and its employees.87 The
Court found that TWA had adopted a neutral seniority system in
order to comply with various collective-bargaining agreements.88
The Court found that there was “no suggestion of discriminatory
intent”89 in adopting the seniority system and concluded that
TWA’s inability to reasonably accommodate Hardison’s religious
practices could not be attributed to an intent to discriminate.90
Rather, the collective-bargaining agreements, not the employer,
determined when an employee was scheduled to work based on
seniority, and TWA would be in violation of the agreement if it
interfered to accommodate Hardison.91
The established
“seniority system was not designed with the intention to
discriminate against religion,”92 and thus, “absent a
discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system
cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system
has some discriminatory consequences.”93 The Court held that
under Title VII, TWA was not required to “carve out a special
exception to its seniority system in order to help Hardison to
meet his religious obligations.”94
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[P]lacing such a burden on plaintiffs who challenge seniority
systems with admitted discriminatory impact, a burden never
before imposed in civil suits brought under Title VII, frustrates
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Id. at 88 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 96.
97
Id. at 85 (majority opinion).
98
Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
99
456 U.S. 273 (1982).
100
Id. at 277 (quoting Hardison, 432 U.S. at 82) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 294–95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96
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Justice Marshall vehemently dissented from the Court’s
decision, arguing that the holding made “a mockery of the
statute.”95 Justice Marshall’s dissent notes that “an employer
cannot . . . sign[] a contract that precludes all reasonable
accommodations”96 because doing so would have an impact on all
of those “who do not observe the holy days on which most
businesses are closed.”97 Justice Marshall felt that the Court’s
interpretation of the statute effectively nullified Title VII by not
allowing employees who belonged to unions with collectivebargaining agreements to bring suit for discrimination without
proof of discriminatory intent.98
Pullman-Standard v. Swint99 also addressed proof
requirements and marks one of Justice Marshall’s most
significant dissenting opinions on Title VII. Pullman-Standard
brought to fruition Justice Marshall’s fear that the Court was
systematically narrowing the scope of Title VII and constricting
access to the courts by imposing more stringent proof standards.
The Court reinforced its ruling in Hardison by holding, “[A]bsent
a discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system
cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system
has some discriminatory consequences.”100 Thus, whenever there
is a challenge to a seniority system under Title VII, it will require
a trial on the issue of discriminatory intent to determine whether
the employer adopted the system “because of its racially
discriminatory impact.”101
Justice Marshall disagreed with the Court’s continued efforts
to enforce stricter pleading and proof requirements on
employees.102 He expressed his concern stating:
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the clearly expressed will of Congress and effectively “freeze[s]
an entire generation of . . . employees into discriminatory
patterns that existed before the Act.”103
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Id. at 295.
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Id. at 336.
Id.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 352–53.
Id. at 381 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The majority’s position directly conflicted with Justice Marshall’s
jurisprudential philosophy that relaxed pleading and proof
requirements ensured access to courts to effect social change.
Instead, by increasing the burden of proof, the Court left
potential victims of discrimination with less avenues to effect
change and improve their position in the workplace.
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States,104 the Court had to determine exactly what evidence could
support allegations of discrimination. The Court held that, as
plaintiff, “the Government bore the initial burden of making out
a prima facie case of discrimination.”105 The government then
had the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the company’s regularly conducted and standard
operating procedure was discriminatory.106 The Court approved
the use of statistical proof to establish a prima facie case of
systematic discrimination.107
The Court limited systematic
discrimination to employer actions that occurred after the
passage of Title VII, holding that “the routine application of a
bona fide seniority system would not be unlawful under Title VII”
because Congress did not intend to destroy any “vested seniority
rights of employees simply because their employer had engaged
in discrimination prior to the passage of the Act.”108
Although Justice Marshall concurred with the Court’s
finding of discrimination based on the statistical evidence
presented by the plaintiff, he once again warned the Court of the
danger of failing to grant broad deference to the EEOC’s issued
guidelines and to prior decisions that rejected upholding
seniority systems that allow discriminatory practices.109 While
this case appears to broaden the burden-of-proof evidentiary
standards by allowing statistical evidence, Justice Marshall was
quick to note that in Hardison, which was decided during the
same term, the majority had simultaneously enfeebled the
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employee’s ability to make a prima facie case by disallowing the
use of seniority rights systems as definitive proof of employment
discrimination.110 Justice Marshall argued that the Court failed
to consider the legislative history of the Act, which did not
“support the conclusion that Congress intended to legalize
seniority systems that perpetuate discrimination.”111 Justice
Marshall further contended that the Court had not objectively
examined the Act’s legislative history, and if it had, “it would
have been compelled to reach the opposite conclusion.”112 The
Court’s finding that seniority rights systems were not per se
actionable under Title VII minimized the scope of Title VII and
foreshadowed the narrowing interpretation of Title VII’s access
and remedies.113
III. THE CHANGING TIDES
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110
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 294 (1982) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
111
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 383.
112
Id. at 384.
113
Id.
114
Belton, Burdens of Pleading, supra note 68, at 1208–09.
115
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
116
Belton, Burdens of Pleading, supra note 68, at 1224–25.
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In its attempts to clarify Title VII, the Court created
confusion over the procedural framework in discrimination
cases.114
Cases such as Hardison, Pullman-Standard, and
International Brotherhood of Teamsters led to inconsistencies in
how lower courts determined what pleading burdens would be
placed on employees and employers and what evidence could be
offered to prove or rebut a claim of discrimination. But as the
Court gradually became more conservative, the pleading and
proof standards became consistently more rigid. For instance,
the proof requirement established in McDonnell Douglas shifted
from an employee having to rebut as pretextual an employer’s
nondiscriminatory justification for its actions to requiring an
employee to make a showing of definitive discriminatory
intent.115
With the requirement of showing discriminatory
intent, employment discrimination became nearly impossible to
prove, and the power of Title VII effectively disappeared.116 But
while the Court’s approach to pleadings and proof may have
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487 U.S. 977 (1988).
Id. at 982.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 983.
Id. at 990–91.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 991.
Id.
Id. at 986.
Id. at 985–86.
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changed, Justice Marshall continued to advocate for the
McDonnell Douglas pleading standards and rejected the
Court-compelled heightened burden of proof.
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,117 the Court dealt
with evidentiary standards as they applied to a claim of
disparate impact under Title VII.118 A black female employee of
Fort Worth Bank was denied a promotion to a supervisory
position on four separate occasions in favor of white applicants.119
The bank “had not developed precise and formal criteria for
evaluating candidates for” promotions, but instead relied “on the
subjective judgment of [white] supervisors who were acquainted
with the candidates and with the nature of the jobs to be
filled.”120 The employee brought a claim under Title VII, alleging
that the bank’s promotion policies were racially discriminatory.121
The Court had to determine how to analyze a disparate impact
claim in which the employer used subjective criteria in
determining promotions,122 stating that “[o]ur decisions have not
addressed the question whether disparate impact analysis may
be applied to cases in which subjective criteria are used to make
employment decisions.”123 The Court held that “disparate impact
analysis may in principle be applied to subjective as well as to
objective practices.”124
After the Court determined the proper analysis for subjective
promotional practices, the Court then had to establish the
appropriate evidentiary standard.125 The Court reaffirmed its
decision in Teamsters by holding that “the plaintiff is required to
prove that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or
motive.”126
The Court reiterated the McDonnell Douglas
three-prong proof and pleading test to analyze Title VII claims
and extended its application to disparate impact cases.127
However, the Court held that “[t]he ultimate burden of
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Id. at 986 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 994.
Id. at 997–98.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 1009 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
Id.
Id. at 1001.
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Belton, supra note 3, at 464.
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persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the
plaintiff.”128 The Court acknowledged that by allowing the
employer to use subjective tests for employment practices,
employees faced a much higher burden to establish that the
employment practices were intentionally discriminatory, as
opposed to just preferential.129 This proof requirement allowed
employers to have a lower burden in meeting the business
necessity criteria.130 The Court justified requiring a higher
burden for employees, holding that the shifting burden
evidentiary standards sufficiently safeguarded Congress’s intent
to ensure the strength of Title VII.131
Justice Marshall joined in a concurring opinion, agreeing
with the plurality’s judgment, but not with the allocation of
burdens of proof. The concurring Justices warned that “to lessen
the employer’s burden of justifying an employment practice that
produces a disparate impact simply because the practice relies
upon subjective assessments” was inconsistent with the
principles of Title VII.132 By “[a]llowing an employer to escape
liability simply by articulating vague, inoffensive-sounding
subjective criteria would disserve Title VII’s goal of eradicating
discrimination in employment.”133 The Court’s ruling to allocate
the ultimate burden of proof to the employee was contradicted by
earlier rulings, and Justice Marshall reiterated that an employee
“who successfully establishes [a] prima facie case shifts the
burden of proof” to the employer to show that the employment
practice is justified by business necessity and is not intentionally
discriminatory.134
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,135 the Court
“completely dismantled the disparate impact theory.”136 The
Court’s holding “made it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by adopting a
more rigorous standard for the use of statistical evidence and
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Id. at 466.
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656–57.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id. at 656 (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 672.
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substantially easing the burden of defendants to prove they meet
the business necessity test.”137 The Court ruled that in a
disparate impact claim brought pursuant to Title VII, an
employee would have to show more than just a racial imbalance
in the workforce.138 The Court held that the “plaintiff’s burden in
establishing a prima facie case goes beyond the need to show that
there are statistical disparities in the employer’s work force.”139
Instead, the Court required an employee to show that the
“application of a specific or particular employment
practice . . . created the disparate impact under attack.”140
Moreover, the Court made the plaintiff responsible “for isolating
and identifying the specific employment practices that are
allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities.”141
As if raising the plaintiff’s burden of proof was not enough, the
Court lowered the employer’s proof requirements, holding that
the business-necessity defense had “no requirement that the
challenged practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the
employer’s business.”142 The Court found that a greater degree of
scrutiny “would be almost impossible for most employers to meet,
and would result in a host of evils.”143 By drastically shifting the
burden of proof to the plaintiff, the majority opinion in Wards
Cove all but made a claim under Title VII impossible for an
employee to prove.
Justice Marshall joined in a dissent, which ardently opposed
the majority’s requirement that an employee prove an employer’s
discriminatory intent. According to the dissent, the issue was
whether an employment practice has a significant, adverse effect
on an identifiable class of workers, “regardless of the cause or
motive for the practice.”144 The dissent contended that the
majority’s decision rejected “the statutory construction that
developed in the wake of Griggs” and found this disturbing
because the decision in Griggs “correctly reflected the intent of
the Congress that enacted Title VII.”145 The Wards Cove decision
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effectively amounted to “a rejection of a consistent interpretation
of a federal statute.”146 The dissent concluded that the majority
“[t]urn[ed] a blind eye to the meaning and purpose of Title VII,
[and] the majority’s opinion perfunctorily reject[ed] a
longstanding rule of law [which] underestimate[d] the probative
value of evidence of a racially stratified work force.”147 Thus,
where a plaintiff might have been granted deference in a factual
analysis, the defendant now had the upper hand.148 As such, the
Court’s analysis could arguably be as follows: “Defendant’s
validation data standing alone could be accepted. Plaintiff’s
challenge raises some serious doubts as to the probative value of
defendant’s data. But since I don’t know whose statistics are
more accurate, and since plaintiff carries the burden of
persuading me, and he didn’t, defendant wins.”149
Finally, Justice Marshall joined the plurality in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.150 There, the plaintiff proved that she
had been discriminated against on the basis of sex.151 The trial
court found that remarks pertaining to the plaintiff, which were
relied on to deny her a position as partner in the accounting firm,
“stemmed from an impermissibly cabined view of the proper
behavior of women.”152 The Court affirmed the lower court’s
finding of discrimination but disagreed with the standard of proof
the lower courts applied to the employer.153 Writing for the
plurality, Justice Brennan explained:
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Id. at 663.
148
Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 36. (1989).
149
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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Id. at 251.
152
Id. at 236–37.
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Id. at 252–53.
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Id.
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The courts below held that an employer . . . must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that it would have made the same
decision in the absence of discrimination. We are persuaded
that the better rule is that the employer must make this
showing by a preponderance of the evidence.154
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Just as Justice Marshall took the position that the burden of
proof for the plaintiff in making a prima facie case should be
reasonable, he took the same position on employers, rejecting the
higher clear and convincing standard of proof.155
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 AND
JUSTICE MARSHALL’S VINDICATION
To counter the Court’s decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,156 portions of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,157 and other
employment discrimination cases in which Justice Marshall took
issue with the majority view,158 Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, completely invalidating the precedent set by these
cases.159 Congress explicitly stated its intentions for the Act:
The purposes of this Act are—
(1) to
provide
appropriate
remedies
for
intentional
discrimination and unlawful harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of “business necessity” and “job
related” enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S.
642 (1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory
guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.);
and
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Id. at 253.
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
157
While Congress upheld the preponderance of evidence burden of proof, it
rejected that portion of the decision that created the “same decision” defense. This
defense allowed an employer to prove that it would have reached the same decision
regarding the employee’s status absent any discriminatory considerations. But this
defense not only allowed an employer to limit the remedy, it also operated as a
complete defense to liability. See Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the
Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
205, 211–14 (2007).
158
Congress also reversed Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171
(1989) (holding that an employee could not sue for damages under section 1981 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in relation to conditions of employment caused by racial
harassment), and Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761–62 (1989) (permitting white
firefighters to challenge a consent decree in a case to which they had not been
parties).
159
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
156
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(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by
expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to
provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.160

Congress drew from Griggs in restoring a plaintiff’s power in
disparate impact cases by allowing the plaintiff to allege
discriminatory impact as a basis for a Title VII claim without a
requisite showing of intent.161 The Act expanded civil rights
statutes and allowed for greater access to the courts, which
Justice Marshall strongly advocated for under Title VII cases.
Justice Marshall’s view on the burden allocated to the employer
was also incorporated into the Act. The Act “imposes on the
employer the burden of persuasion for business necessity and job
relatedness”162 and holds an employer liable for a claim under
Title VII if that employer “fails to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with business necessity.”163 By doing so, Congress
affirmed Justice Marshall’s interpretation of Title VII regarding
burdens of proof and pleading for both parties.
CONCLUSION
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Id. § 3.
Id. § 105.
162
Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From Conciliation to
Litigation—How Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141 MIL. L. REV. 1,
31 (1993).
163
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164
Turner, supra note 1, at 427–28.
165
Elizabeth Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMP. POL. &
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1996).
166
Id. at 4–5.
161
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As written, Title VII set forth the lofty goal of combating
various forms of discrimination in the workplace but gave little
guidance to the courts on the requirements for effective
enforcement of the Act.164 This left the Supreme Court to define
what constituted discrimination that violated Title VII and
determine the scope of the statute.165 Of most significance, Title
VII did not give statutory guidance on how to plead and prove a
violation; nor did it address specifically when an employer would
be liable under Title VII.166 The initial decisions issued by the
Court broadened the scope of Title VII and attempted to
eliminate the ambiguity in the statute, making it easier for an
employee to seek redress under Title VII.
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The early opinions of the Court also aligned with Justice
Marshall’s jurisprudence and supported the theory of social
engineering by broadening equal access to the courts. As the
Court became increasingly more conservative, it issued a number
of opinions making Title VII violations more difficult to prove.
As access to courts became more restricted, Justice Marshall
found his position on the Court shifting towards concurrence and
dissent. Justice Marshall wrote to ensure that Title VII was
enforced as Congress intended.
Congress vindicated Justice Marshall and the early Court
decisions by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to combat
pervasive and entrenched racial discrimination in employment
“by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order
to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”167 It
is fitting that Justice Marshall joined the majority or concurred
in those cases that established reasonable proof and pleading
standards that made seeking judicial relief less formidable. In
doing so, Justice Marshall and his colleagues expanded Title VII
so that modern social engineers have the necessary tools to bring
discrimination cases and the ability to use established precedent
to construct a more equal workplace.168
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